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Waterfall Cmty. Water Users Ass'n v. N.M. State Eng'r, 216 P.3d 270
(N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that New Mexico Statute section 72-5-29
does not grant a superseding natural right to appropriate waters of a
fully appropriated stream system).
Waterfall Community Water Users Association ("Waterfall")
submitted an application for 320 acre-feet per year of surface water
from Culberson Spring, a tributary to Pecos River. The State of New
Mexico Office of the State Engineer ("State Engineer") concluded that
granting Waterfall's application would impair existing water rights to
water in the Pecos River stream system and denied Waterfall's
application. Waterfall appealed to the Twelfth Judicial District Court of
New Mexico. Waterfall argued that section 72-5-29 of the New Mexico
Statutes allows Waterfall to divert waters from the Culberson Spring for
the domestic uses of the inhabitants of the land adjacent to the
Culberson Spring as long as any distribution of water does not interfere
with vested rights. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the State Engineer finding that there was no available water for
appropriation in the Pecos River stream system, that Culberson Springs
was a tributary and part of the Pecos River stream system, and that the
provisions of section 72-5-29 were inapplicable to Waterfall's claim.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico addressed
Waterfall's assertion of a "natural right" to the fully appropriated water
in Culberson Spring under section 72-5-29. Waterfall conceded it could
only exercise the alleged natural right if doing so would not interfere
with preexisting vested water rights, but maintained that exercising its
natural right to the waters of Culberson Spring would have little or no
adverse impact on the existing appropriations in the Pecos River stream
system. Waterfall supported this argument by offering the opinion of
their domestic water system operator, James Murrill. Mr. Murrill's
affidavit stated that based on his personal knowledge, most of the water
Waterfall sought to appropriate would be "discharged back into the
ground in the valley through individual liquid waste disposal systems."
The court primarily addressed two issues. First, the court analyzed
whether section 72-5-29 provided Waterfall with a superseding natural
right to appropriate waters from the Culberson Spring notwithstanding
the fact that there is no unappropriated water in Pecos River stream
system.
Second, the court analyzed whether the district court
improperly denied Waterfall an opportunity to exercise this right by
granting summary judgment. To determine these issues, the court
initially looked at the plain language of section 72-5-29.
According to both the plain language of the statute and the State
Engineer's explanation of the statute, section 72-5-29 is limited to the
narrow purpose of conserving and utilizing torrential floodwater. The
intended effect of the statute is to smooth out the water supply curve by
allowing water to be impounded during periods of excess supply, which
otherwise would not be placed to beneficial use. The plain language of
the statute comports with the conclusion that the State Engineer could
grant such an application only if there is unappropriated water to
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appropriate and such appropriation would not deprive prior rights
holders of that water. Thus, the Legislature did not create a "super
status water use" for utilization of floodwaters.
The court concluded that summary judgment was proper as a
matter of law because section 72-5-29 concerns flood waters and
Waterfall was not asserting a right to flood waters, but to water from
Culberson Spring.
Furthermore, Waterfall was not entitled to
appropriation under section 72-5-29 because this statute does not
provide Waterfall a superseding natural right to water from a fully
appropriated stream system. The only basis for Waterfall's argument
responding to the unavailability of unappropriated waters was from Mr.
Murrill's opinion, based on personal knowledge, that individual liquid
waste disposal systems would return the water Waterfall sought to
appropriate back to vested rights holders. The court dismissed Mr.
Murill's testimony because it was opinion testimony unsupported by
scientific fact and thus insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's ruling.
Karna Swenson Phipps
UTAH
Otter Creek Reservoir Co. v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 203 P.3d
1015 (Utah 2009) (holding that a water user must complete seven years
of adverse use by the 1939 effective date of an amendment to the water
right statute to obtain a water right by adverse possession).
Otter Creek Reservoir Company ("Otter Creek") and New Escalante
Irrigation Company ("New Escalante") claimed rights to snow melt near
the divide between the Sevier River drainage and the Escalante River
drainage. Without a diversion, the water would flow into the Sevier
River, which forms part of Otter Creek's water supply. New Escalante
claimed that it adversely used the water since December 1, 1936 by way
of a ditch that intercepted the water and carried it to the Escalante
River drainage. The issue concerned the application of a 1939
amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 which prohibited the
acquisition of water rights by adverse use. Prior to 1939, water users
could obtain a right through seven years of "continuous, uninterrupted,
hostile, notorious, adverse use." Otter Creek filed an action with the
Sixth District Court in Utah against New Escalante in 2001 seeking a
declaratory judgment that New Escalante had no right to use the water.
New Escalante filed a counterclaim, arguing that it had a diligence
right, or, in the alternative, a superior right based on adverse use.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Otter
Creek with respect to the diligence claim, holding that New Escalante
forfeited its right by not participating in the 1936 adjudication of all
water rights in the Sevier River drainage ("Cox Decree"). The district
court denied summary judgment regarding the adverse use claim,
holding that because New Escalante's adverse use began prior to the
effective date of the amended statute in 1936, the use could still ripen

